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Abstract
Byzantine (i.e. arbitrary) faults occur as a result of software errors and malicious
attacks; they are increasingly a problem as people come to depend more and more on
online services. Systems that provide critical services must behave correctly in the
face of Byzantine faults. Correct service in the presence of failures is achieved through
replication: the service runs at a number of replica servers and as more than a third
of the replicas are non-faulty, the group as a whole continues to behave correctly. We
would like the service to be able to authenticate data. Authenticated data is data
that more than a third of the service is willing to sign.
If a long-lived replicated service can tolerate f failures, then we do not want the
adversary to have the lifetime of the system to compromise more than f replicas. One
way to limit the amount of time an adversary has to compromise more than f replicas
is to reconfigure the system, moving the responsibility for the service from one group of
servers to a new group of servers. Reconfiguration allows faulty servers to be removed
from service and replaced with newly introduced correct servers. Reconfiguration
is also desirable because the servers can become targets for malicious attacks, and
moving the service thwarts such attacks.
In a replicated service, we would like the service to be able to authenticate data.
Authenticated data is data that more than a third of the service is willing to sign.
Any party that knows a public key can verify the signature. Such a scheme is a
threshold signature scheme. The signers in a threshold signature scheme each know
some part of a secret. Because we would like to reconfigure the system, we need to
transfer the knowledge of the secret to the new servers and we want to disable the
old servers from signing in the future. Such a scheme is called secret refreshing.
This thesis describes TSPSS, a threshold signing and proactive secret sharing pro-
tocol. TSPSS can be used by asynchronous reconfigurable Byzantine fault tolerant
service replicas to perform threshold signing and secret refreshing. TSPSS uses com-
binatorial secret sharing, which involves an exponential number of shares in f. We
implement TSPSS to evaluate how well it scales and whether it performs well enough
to be used in practice. We find that TSPSS performs well enough to be used for
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f = 1, is arguably good enough for f = 2, and is impractical for f = 3. Thus, a
better solution to this problem is needed.
Thesis Supervisor: Barbara Liskov
Title: Ford Professor of Engineering
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Byzantine (i.e. arbitrary) faults occur as a result of software errors and malicious
attacks; they are increasingly a problem as people come to depend more and more
on on-line services. Systems that provide critical services must behave correctly in
the face of Byzantine faults. Correct service in the presence of failures is achieved
through replication: the service runs at a number of replica servers and as long as
enough replicas are non-faulty, the group as a whole continues to behave correctly.
In [2], Castro and Liskov propose a replication algorithm for Byzantine fault-
tolerance in asynchronous systems that offers good performance and strong correct-
ness guarantees provided that no more than 1/3 of the servers fail. The amount of
time an adversary has to compromise more than 1/3 of the servers is called the win-
dow of vulnerability. If no mechanism is used to reduce the window of vulnerability,
the window is the lifetime of the system. To reduce the window of vulnerability, Ro-
drigues and Liskov[12] propose to reconfigure the system, moving the responsibility
for the service from one group of servers to a new group of servers. Reconfiguration
allows faulty servers to be removed from service and replaced with newly introduced
correct servers. Reconfiguration is also desirable because the servers can become
targets for malicious attacks, and moving the service thwarts such attacks.
Secure reconfiguration requires a way for the current set of servers to be able to
prove to other processors in the system (e.g., processes running code that uses the
service) that it truly is the current server set. Otherwise, faulty servers such as those
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previously removed from the system can pretend to be the current server set and
cause the system to behave incorrectly.
To achieve secure reconfiguration, the current server set can generate a signed
proof that allows anyone who knows a particular public key to verify the signature.
The corresponding private key is a secret and each of the current servers has a share
of the secret. The signature can be generated if and only if more than one third of
the current replica servers sign with their shares of the private key.
This thesis describes TSPSS, a threshold signing and proactive secret sharing pro-
tocol that addresses the authentication needs of a reconfigurable Byzantine fault
tolerant service that operates in an asynchronous environment. This thesis describes
how the current server set generates a signature and how the old server set transfers
the secret to the new server set.
Our secret refreshing protocol is based on the APSS protocol described by Zhou
et al in [15]. We improve on that work in two aspects. The first is that our refresh
protocol works across 2 sets of servers, with one set of servers transferring their col-
lective knowledge of the secret to another set of servers that previously did not know
about the secret. The second difference is that where agreement is needed, we use the
Castro and Liskov's replication algorithm to achieve agreement. Castro and Liskov's
replication algorithm [2] is a practical algorithm for state machine replication [13, 9]
that tolerates Byzantine faults. For the rest of this thesis, we will refer to the Castro
and Liskov replication algorithm as BFT.
1.1 TSPSS Overview
TSPSS is intended for use in a Byzantine fault tolerant system. In Byzantine fault
tolerant systems, the number of servers, n, running a service is usually 3f + 1, where
f is the number of faulty servers that the system can tolerate within a window of
vulnerability. This is the same as saying that less than 1/3 of the servers running
the service can be faulty. It has been proven that n must be greater than 3f to
reach Byzantine agreement. Although TSPSS will work for n > 3f + 1, we assume
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n = 3f + 1 for the rest of this thesis.
To tolerate f faulty servers, we want f or fewer servers to be unable to generate a
valid signature. Thus, at least one good server must sign in order for a valid signature
to be generated. We want a group of correct servers to be able to generate a valid
signature. In the cryptography literature, this type of signing scheme is an (n, k + 1)
threshold signature scheme [6], with n = 3f + 1 and k = f. In an (n, k+1) threshold
signature scheme there are n shares of a private key and one corresponding public
key. A message signed by any k + 1 of the private keys can be verified by the public
key. A message signed by k or fewer of the private keys will not be verified by the
public key.
We want to combine a threshold signature scheme with a proactive secret sharing
scheme, with the threshold scheme's private key, in its entirety, being the secret of an
(n, k + 1) proactive secret sharing, also with n = 3f + 1 and k = f.
An (n, k + 1) secret sharing [14] for a secret s is a set of n random shares such
that (i) s can be recovered with knowledge of k + 1 shares, and (ii) no information
about s can be derived from k or fewer shares. Share refreshing [6, 8] is where servers
periodically create a new and independent set of secret shares for the same secret,
replacing the old shares with the new shares. Secret sharing with share refreshing is
called proactive secret sharing.
Property (ii) of secret sharing ensures that f or fewer servers cannot reconstruct
the private key. Since our secret is a private key, we never want to reconstruct
the secret. To generate signatures without reconstructing the secret, each server's
threshold signature private key must be derivable from the shares of the secret that
the server has.
When a new set of servers become responsible for the service, this new set of servers
will need to be able to generate a signature that corresponds to the same public key.
And, the old server set should no longer be able to generate a signature that can be
verified by the public key. Allowing new servers to sign can be accomplished through
secret refreshing from the old server set to the new server set with n = 3f + 1 and
k = f. Once the new servers have the new shares, correct old servers forget any
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information that can be used to infer old or new shares. Once the 2f + 1 correct
old servers forget their shares, there are not enough old shares to produce a valid
signature.
1.2 Thesis Outline
The remainder of this thesis is organizes as follows. Chapter 2 describes the sys-
tem model, assumptions, and correctness conditions. In Chapter 3, we describe the
threshold signing and proactive secret sharing protocol. Chapter 4 describes how the
protocol is implemented. We then evaluate the costs of running TSPSS, in terms
of computation time and network bandwidth used, in Chapter 5. We present our
conclusions in chapter 6.
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Chapter 2
System Model and Assumptions
Consider a system composed of a set of processors that communicate through a net-
work. For each window of vulnerability, there are n processors that are responsible
for the service during that period of time. While a processor is responsible for the
service, we call it a server. Once a processor is no longer responsible for the service,
it is no longer a server.
Servers hold the shares of a secret. Each processor is assumed to have an indi-
vidual public/private key pair. Each server is assumed to know the public key of all
other processors in the system. Cryptographic techniques are employed to provide
confidentiality and authenticity for messages. It is assumed that the adversary is
computationally bound and that the factoring problem and the discrete logarithm
problem are hard so that the adversary cannot subvert these cryptographic tech-
niques.
2.1 Attacks and Failures
TSPSS is intended for use in environments like the Internet, where failures and attacks
can invalidate assumptions about timing. Thus, we assume an asynchronous system
where there is no bound on message delay or processor execution speed. We assume
that the network through which the processors are connected is composed of fair links.
A fair link is a communication channel between processors that does not necessarily
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deliver all messages sent, but if a processor sends sufficiently many message to a single
destination, then one of those message is correctly delivered. Messages in transit may
be read or altered by the adversary.
As we mentioned earlier, less than 1/3 of the servers in a window of vulnerability
can be faulty. A server is either correct or faulty. A faulty server can stop executing the
protocol, deviate from its specified protocol in an arbitrary manner, and/or corrupt
or disclose locally stored information. A correct server follows the protocol and does
not corrupt or disclose locally stored information. A server is considered correct in
a time interval T if and only if it is correct throughout interval r. Otherwise it is
considered faulty in time T.
With the system model and assumptions described above, an adversary is allowed
to do any or all of the following in order to cause the most damage to the replicated
service:
" compromise and coordinate up to f faulty servers within any window of vulner-
ability
" delay messages or correct servers by arbitrarily finite amounts,
" launch eavesdropping, message insertion, corruption, deletion, and replay at-
tacks
2.2 Window of Vulnerability Definition
The window of vulnerability in TSPSS is defined in terms of events rather than the
passing of time. To give a precise definition for the window of vulnerability, we
assign version numbers (vo, v1i, v2, ... ) to shares, secret sharings, runs, and participating
service replicas. Each execution, or run, of TSPSS generates a new secret sharing. A
sharing is composed of the set of random shares which form a secret s:
" Servers initially store shares with version number vo.
* If a run is executed with shares having version number Vold v , then this run
and the resulting new shares have version number new = vi 1.
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Epoch vi
Run vi1 Shares v, Run vi Shares vi Run
Epoch v,-,
Figure 2-1: Relationship Between Runs, Shares, and Epochs
e A secret sharing is assigned the same version number as its shares.
Run Vnew starts when some correct server initiates run Vnew locally. Run Vnew
terminates locally on a correct server once the server has forgotten all information
pertinent to Vold shares. Run Vnew terminates globally at the earliest time t that the
run has terminated locally on each correct server that participated in run Vnew.
An epoch vi is defined to be the interval from the start of the run vi to the global
termination of run vi+. The relations between old and new runs, shares, and epochs,
and their surrounding runs, shares and epochs is illustrated in Figure 2-1. In a
successful attack, an adversary must collect f + 1 or more shares all with the same
version number. Since f + 1 or more servers must be compromised during the same
epoch in order to collect these shares, we define the window of vulnerability to be an
epoch.
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Chapter 3
The TSPSS Protocol
In this chapter, we describe the TSPSS protocol. We first describe how to split up
the secret into shares. Then, we describe how to generate a signature using these
shares and how to refresh the shares so that new nodes learn new shares of the same
secret, which are independent from the old shares.
In describing the protocol, we assume that communications channels are secure
because authenticity and confidentiality can be achieved through signing and encrypt-
ing the messages. We will use nodes interchangeably with processors so that we can
use ni to stand for a node, and si to stand for a secret share.
3.1 Combinatorial Secret Sharing
The way we're going to share a secret and achieve a threshold access structure is to
use the combinatorial secret sharing [7] technique described by Ito et al. We split the
secret up into 1 shares, where 1 - (3fl). A share is given a label from 1 to 1. We
find all possible combinations of f nodes from our 3f + 1 nodes, and we label each
group of f nodes with a number from 1 to 1. Then, a node ni gets a share si with
label t if node ni is not in a group with label t.
We give an example for f = 1. For f = 1, 1 = 4 so we have four shares: s1 , s2, S3,
S4. We generate all possible groups of f =1 servers and label them with numbers 1
to I (i.e., gi = {ni}, 92 = {n 2 }, g = {n 3 }, 94 = {n 4 }). Then we give share si to all
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index i shares si | groups gi | nodes given share si|
1 Si i 1 = {n} n2, n3, n4
2 s2 92= {n 2 } ni, n3 , n4
3 s3 93 = {fn 3 } i, n2, n4
4 S4 94 ={n4} fni, n2, n3
Table 3.1: Combinatorial Secret Sharing for f = 1
nodes not in group gi, (i.e., nodes n 2 , n3 , n4). Similarly, we give share S2 to all nodes
not in group 92, s3 to all nodes not in 93, and s4 to all nodes not in 94. Table 3.1
summarizes the results for f = 1.
Now, by construction,
" Each share is held by 2f+1 nodes.
" No set of less than f+I nodes have all of the shares
" Any set of f+I1 or more nodes will have all of the shares'
3.2 Threshold Signing
With combinatorial secret sharing, we can use the RSA cryptosystem to generate
threshold signatures. Normally, RSA has one key pair: a private key and a corre-
sponding public key. The public key is denoted as (N, e), where N = pq and p, q are
large primes of roughly the same size. Define # - (p - 1)(q - 1). The private key is d
where ed -1 mod 4 and e is the public RSA exponent. To sign a message m, com-
pute signed message c = md mod N. To verify the message, compute m' = ce mod N.
Since m' = ce mod N = med mod N, and ed = 1 mod #, the signature is valid if and
only if m' equals m.
The private key d is the secret we share combinatorially. As such, we must split
it into 1 shares: di, d2,..., dj. We call a signature generated by one share of the secret
key a partial signature. The nice thing about RSA is that if the I shares sum to
'For any given share, only f nodes do not have the share, every other node has it. Then, for each
share, given a group of any f+1 of the 3f+1 nodes, at least one of the nodes has the share
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d, then the product of all the partial signatures (i.e., ci = mdi mod N), is the RSA
signature that we expect in the normal scheme described above. I.e., if
d= di mod N (3.1)
then
c = md mod N = lm di mod N (3.2)
i=1
Thus, when starting the system, the trusted dealer generates the shares satisfying
the constraints posed by Equation 3.1 by picking random integers that sum to the
secret:
" For 2 < i < 1, choose random integers di E [-iN 2..1N 2]
" Compute d, = d - i_ 2 di
After generating the shares, give them to the nodes following the method described
in Section 3.1. We use di's as the si's discussed in Section 3.1.
Notice that each node has more than one share and that each share must be
used exactly once when generating a valid signature. We generate a valid signature
as follows. When asked to sign something, each node first determines whether the
message should be signed2 . If the message should be signed, the node generates one
partial signature per share of the secret it holds. Then, the node sends all of the
partial signatures to the requester. Recall that each share is held by 2f + 1 nodes
of which at most f are faulty. Thus, the requester determines a partial signature
to be correct when it receives the same partial signature from f + 1 nodes. The
requester can compute the complete signature by multiplying together the 1 correct
partial signatures.
For example, for f = 1, node 1 asks itself and nodes 2, 3, 4 to sign. Then, node 1
receives replies from itself and nodes 2 and 3. Now, node 1 has the following partial
2See Section 4.2 for how node determine whether a message should be signed
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signatures:
From node i ci c2 c 3  c 4
1 X X X
2 X X X
3 X X X
Node 1 has received f +1 copies of each partial signature, thus knows that the partial
signatures it received are correct.
3.2.1 Alternatives and Optimizations
Since many nodes have the same share, if at least f + 1 of the nodes are behaving
correctly, it is unnecessary for them to all generate partial signatures. Generating
a partial signature means creating a digest of the message and taking that digest
to the power of the subshare (i.e., performing an exponentiation). Performing an
exponentiation is an expensive computation whereas adding partial shares together
is a cheap computation. Furthermore, sending all of the partial signatures back to
the requester takes up more network bandwidth.
Thus, here is an alternative we will call TS2. TS2 is an optimistic approach that
reduces the amount of computing and bandwidth used by receivers of sign requests.
In TS2, the requester picks a group of f + 1 nodes. We call this group gsign. The
requester asks for a signature from each node in gign, also telling them which f
other nodes are in gsign. Then each node in gsign has a notion of which shares it is
responsible for when generating this signature. The way a node determines which
shares it is responsible for is that each node knows which shares every other node
has. Given the f other nodes in gsign, node ni is responsible for all the shares that ni
has, minus all the shares held by the nodes in gign with smaller id numbers. A node
returns a signature generated by all the shares it is responsible for.
We give an example for f = 1. Suppose we choose g ign = {ni, n2}. Then, node ni
is responsible for all the shares it has (i.e., 27 S3, 4) because there are no nodes with a
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smaller id number than 1. n 2 is responsible for the shares it has (i.e., si, s3 , s 4) minus
the shares node ni has, leaving n 2 responsible for si. ni returns (ms2+s3+s4 mod N)
to the requester. n 2 returns (ms1 mod N) to the requester.
When the requester receives the f + 1 responses, it can multiply the signatures
together and check to see if the combined signature is valid. If the signature does not
verify, or f + 1 responses are not received within a set amount of time, the requester
can try the same thing again with another group of f + 1 nodes and keep trying
until it gets responses that verify. Since there are at least 2f + 1 correct nodes, the
requester is guaranteed to receive responses that verify if it tries enough times.
A hybrid of the full signing protocol described in Section 3.2 and TS2 can also be
used. In the hybrid form, the requester first asks for the TS2 form of signing from
f + 1 nodes. If the requester does not receive the f + 1 responses within a certain
amount of time, or the responses do not result in a valid signature, then instead of
trying the TS2 protocol again with another set of f + 1 nodes, the requester initiates
the full signing protocol, where each node returns one partial signature per share it
has.
3.3 Share Refreshing
For transferring the secret from the old nodes to the new nodes, we describe the
protocol for a single run vi+1. We call run vj+1 the current run, shares and witnesses
with version number vi old shares and witnesses, nodes with shares of version number
v, the old nodes, shares and witnesses with version number vj+1 the new shares and
witnesses, and nodes computing shares with version number v±i+ the new nodes.
Secret sharing involves two operations: split and reconstruct. The split oper-
ation generates a set of random shares from a secret s; we call these shares a sharing
of s. The reconstruct operation recovers s from certain sets of shares. A unique
label is associated with each share and sharing of s.
For share refreshing, we want to split each of the 1 old shares into I subshares.
From the subshares, we want to construct I new shares such that i) the secret s can
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Reconstruct
si ne -s
s s is
--- w--------- ------- --
S 1old S20'a ... Sold
Figure 3-1: Splitting Old Shares and Constructing New Shares
be reconstructed from the 1 new shares and ii) we can perform threshold signing with
the 1 new shares. The relation between the old shares and the secret is that the old
shares sum to the secret. So, the new shares will satisfy (i) and (ii) if the new shares
sum to the secret.
We will generate subshares for each share the same way we generated shares for our
secret in Section 3.1. For a share si, an old node generates subshares sij's by choosing
random integers si~j E [-IN 2..IN'] for 2 < j < 1, and setting si,1 =Si - E1=2 si~J-
To construct the new share sp", a new node computes s?'" = sj,j. Figure 3-1
illustrated the relationship between the old shares and the new shares.
In share refreshing, each old node, for each share si that it holds, generates 1
subshares. The holder then makes a subshare available to only those new nodes that
store a share constructed from that subshare. The old nodes are indexed from 1 to n
and the new nodes are also indexed from I to n. Which shares are held by an old node
and which are held by a new node is determined by the combinatorial secret sharing
described in Section 3.1 based on the nodes' indices. As an example, for f = 1, no"
has shares sold s l and nIewhas shares sew ), sew, s new
Recall that by construction, each share is held by 2f + I nodes. If all nodes were
correct, then for each share of the secret, we can designate I holder of the secret to
generate subshares and send them to the appropriate new nodes. However, f of the
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nodes can be malicious. And, malicious nodes can i) refuse to generate and send new
subshares or ii) generate incorrect subshares that do not reconstruct to the correct
new shares.
To tolerate faulty nodes that refuse to participate, we require that every node
generate new subshares for each of the shares it holds. However, this means that the
new nodes will receive more than one set of subshares per old share, and the new
nodes have to agree on which of the many sets of subshares for an old share to use
when constructing the new shares.
To achieve this agreement, we use the BFT agreement protocol. For each old
share, the BFT agreement protocol decides which old node's set of subshares is used
to construct the shares for the next epoch.
However, having multiple nodes generate subshares for each share does not help
with the problem of a malicious node generating incorrect subshares. We use Feld-
man's Verifiable Secret Sharing [4] to decide whether a node's subsharing is correct.
We briefly describe Feldman's scheme in relation to our shares and subshares. As
in the RSA cryptosystem, p and q are large primes and N = pq. Let g be a publically
known constant that is an element of high order in Z. The order of g is t, where
t is the least positive integer for which g' = 1 mod N. The basic idea behind this
mechanism is that for each share si, there is a public value w - gSi mod N, which
we call a witness. And, when a node generates subshares for a share, the node also
computes and makes available to all new nodes a proof pi,j for every subshare si. A
proof pi,j is defined to be:
Pi,j g9SiJ mod N (3.3)
From the homomorphic properties of the exponentiation function (i.e., 9 a 9b = 9 a+b)
we know a subsharing for share si is correct if the product of all the subshare proofs
for si is equal to the witness for si. i.e.,
wi = 1 Pi,j mod N (3.4)
j=1
In other word, if Equation 3.4 holds, and each proof is computed according to Equa-
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tion 3.3, we know the subshares sum to the share because
Wi =gmod N
= gj=1d"j mod N
=i g'ij mod N
j=1
= lpi, mod N
j=1
Thus, we use the proofs and witnesses to verify the validity of a node's subshares.
An old node makes all of its proofs available to all of the new nodes. Each new node
checks to see that i) for each subshare sij, that the new node receives, the proof for
si, was computed according to Equation 3.3 and ii) all the subshare proofs together
satisfy Equation 3.4. To ensure that all new nodes see the same proofs, the old nodes
write their proofs to the BFT agreement service. The new nodes read their proofs
from the BFT agreement service.
Since any group of f + 1 nodes have all the shares, any group of f + 1 new nodes
will receive all of the subshares for an old share. So, if f + 1 correct new nodes
confirm that an old node's set of subshares is correct, then that old node's subsharing
is known to be correct. When the BFT is deciding which old node's set of subshares
to use for generating new shares, the BFT only considers those nodes' sets that have
been said to be correct by 2f + 1 of the new nodes. The BFT needs to hear from
2f + 1 of the new nodes because f of those nodes may be faulty.
Note that the BFT is a replicated state machine. All the operations invoked on
the BFT is ordered, and the ordering is the same at all of the nodes running a BFT
service. Thus, for each share, the BFT chooses the subhshares of the first old node
to have that share and receive 2f + 1 confirmations from new nodes.
Once a correct set of subshares has been chosen for each old share, new shares
can be computed, as shown in Figure 3-1. While computing the new shares, the new
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nodes also compute the new witnesses.
8new 8j,(35s 2" E j, (3.5)
j=1
new
w new- gsi" mod N - fl g"i (3.6)
j=1
Note that the indices for the subshares have been reversed. Also note that the gsjii's
are the subshare proofs that have already been computed.
When a new node has computed the new shares and witnesses, it sends a computed
message to all the old nodes and the new nodes saying that it has computed the new
shares. Once an old node has heard from 2f + 1 new nodes that the new shares
have been computed, it can delete all its shares and subshares. Once a new node has
heard from 2f + 1 new nodes (which can include itself) that the new shares have been
computed, the new node can delete all the subshares it received. The reason that old
nodes and new nodes wait to hear from 2f + 1 new nodes is because of the way we
constructed our secret shares. By construction, any group of f +1 share holders have
all of the shares. Since there may be a maximum of f faulty nodes, 2f + 1 new nodes
guarantees that at least one correct new node has each share.
If a new node did not participate in the protocol for some reason (e.g., it was slow
or it was disconnected from the other nodes) and it needs to know about its shares,
it can ask other nodes for its shares and the new witnesses. The new node can trust
a witness once it receives f + 1 copies of the same witness. And a new node can trust
its new share by verifying it against the witness. Nodes will only send a share si to
other nodes that are supposed to have si.
The way nodes makes shares and subshares available only to other appropriate
nodes is by encrypting those shares and subshares. To guard against replay attacks
where the adversary records the encrypted subshare messages, corrupts the receiving
node after the epoch has ended, then plays the messages to the now corrupted receiver
and learns those subshares, session keys are established and used to encrypt the shares
and subshares. Session keys are established at the beginning of each epoch and deleted
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at the end of that epoch.
This scheme can tolerate f faulty old nodes and f faulty new nodes. The secret
is the sum of all the chosen subshares, as shown in Figure 3-2.
Reconstruct
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secret. Any group of f faulty new nodes is missing at least one version vj+j share of
the secret. Thus, a group of f faulty old nodes combined with f faulty new nodes
knows the secret minus some random number. For the combined group of f faulty
old node and f faulty new nodes, finding the missing subshare would be equivalent
to trying to guess the secret in the first places
We present the operations provided by the BFT agreement service:
write-proof s This operation is invoked by old nodes. The BFT service knows which
node invoked this operation and stores the proofs in the space allocated for that
node.
read-proof s(nodeID) This operation is invoked by new nodes, with nodeID speci-
fying which old node's proofs the new node wants to read. The BFT service
3 The adversary is reduced to trying to find a number that matches the witness, or trying to find
the number that decrypts correctly.
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returns the proofs if they have been written. Otherwise, the BFT service returns
a NACK indicating that the proofs are not currently available.
node-ok(nodeID) This operation is invoked by a new node, with nodeID specifying
which old node's subshares the new node is confirming to be correct. The BFT
service knows which new node invoked this operation and marks the old node
with nodeID as being confirmed by the new node that invoked this operation.
Once 2f + 1 new nodes confirm an old node's subshares, BFT service goes
through the shares that the old node has. For each share, if no other old node's
subshares have already been chosen, this old node's subshares are chosen. Once
the subshare set for each share has been chosen, the BFT service calculates the
witnesses for the new shares as shown in Equation 3.6.
read-chosen This operation is invoked by new nodes. If a subshare set has been
chosen for all shares, the BFT service returns which node's subshare set has been
chosen for each share. Otherwise, the BFT service returns a NACK indicating
that the subshare set for at least one share has not been chosen.
read-new-witnesses This operation is invoked by new nodes. If a subshare set has
been chosen for all shares, return the corresponding witnesses for the new shares.
Otherwise, the BFT service returns a NACK indicating that the subshare set for
at least one share has not been chosen - thus, new witnesses cannot and have
not been calculated.
Now, we present the steps of the protocol.
Each old node does the following:
1. Notify the new nodes to begin the refreshment protocol, with a refresh config-
uration. A refresh configuration consists of the old nodes, the new nodes, and
the old witnesses. The refresh configuration is threshold signed.
2. For each share it holds, generate subshares and proofs.
3. Send encrypted subshares to the appropriate new nodes.
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4. Write proofs to the BFT agreement service running at the new nodes by invoking
write-proof s.
5. Wait for computed messages from 2f + 1 of the new nodes. Once received,
delete all shares, subshares, witnesses, and the session key for this epoch.
Each new node does the following:
1. Receive the begin message and refresh configuration. Upon verifying the thresh-
old signature, proceed to the next step.
2. Start running the BFT agreement service with the other new nodes.
3. Receive and store the subshares.
4. Read the subshare proofs from the BFT agreement service by invoking read-proof s.
5. Check the proofs using Equations 3.3 and 3.4.
6. If the proofs for all of an old nodes' subshares are correct, invoke the node-ok
operation with this old node's ID.
7. Check with the BFT service to see if there are chosen subshares for every
share (read-chosen). If so, then compute new shares and read new witnesses
(read-new-witnesses). Once have new shares and witnesses, then delete all
subshares. If not, keep checking.
8. Send computed message to all other new and old nodes.
9. Once has received computed messages from 2f + 1 new nodes, delete subshares
received and current session key. Create and distribute new session key.
3.3.1 Alternatives and Optimizations
As in the signing protocol, if all nodes are correct, it is unnecessary for them all
to generate subshares and corresponding proofs. Only one node needs to generate
subshares and proofs for each share. In refreshing, a node has to do a significant
amount of work for each share that it is responsible for. Thus, if we optimistically
assume that all nodes are correct, we assign each of the 3f +1 nodes to be responsible
for an equal number of shares and each node only creates and sends subshares and
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proofs for the shares they are responsible for. To ensure that faulty nodes do not
prevent the refresh protocol from completing, a new node can wait for a set amount
of time after it receives the first refresh header to see if it receives and verifies all the
subshares it needs to compute its new shares. If a node does not receive and verify
all the subshares it needs after a set amount of time, it notifies all the old nodes that
it needs more subshares. If an old node receives more than f of these messages, it
will generate subshares and proofs for all the shares it has.
Another optimization is that instead of each new node directly telling the BFT
agreement service when it has verified the subshares for an old node, each new node
sends a signed confirmation back to the old node upon confirming that old node's
subshares. Each old node collects 2f + 1 of these signed confirmations and submits
them to the BFT agreement service. If the 2f + 1 signatures verify, then the BFT
agreement service will consider that old node's subshares to be correct. The BFT
agreement service then behaves as if it had received 2f + 1 node-ok's for that old
node.
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Chapter 4
Implementation
The TSPSS protocol has been implemented (without alternatives and optimizations)
in 4799 lines of C++ code. It is meant to be used like a library by a Byzantine fault
tolerant service.
The implementation uses the Castro and Rodrigues implementation of the BFT
agreement protocol with BASE [1, 3], the SFS[10] crypt library, and the SFS async
library. The BFT implementation provides agreement. The SFS crypt library ex-
tends the GNU MP library[5], providing an implementation of public-key encryp-
tion/decryption and signing/verifying with the Rabin algorithm. The SFS async
library provides an infrastructure for event driven programming.
The implementation deviates from the TSPSS protocol in two places. First, during
the refreshment protocol, the old nodes do not establish session keys for encryption.
They use the public-key the program is initialized with for encryption throughout the
lifetime of the program. Second, the threshold signing part of the implementation
implements a hybrid scheme similar to the one described in Section 3.2.1 where a node
first picks f + 1 nodes for signing and if that fails, initiates a full signing protocol.
In the implementation, the first f + 1 nodes are always the group of f + 1 chosen for
the first round of signing, which we will call the quick sign.
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Figure 4-1: Each server in a Byzantine fault tolerant service runs the TSPSS library
and it can invoke operations on the library through local unix sockets.
4.1 Software Architecture
Since the TSPSS library is designed to be used by a Byzantine fault tolerant service,
we will call a service that uses the TSPSS library the TSPSS application. Each of
the TSPSS application servers runs the TSPSS library code on a separate process.
The application sends requests to and receives replies from the TSPSS library via
local sockets. This ensures that the TSPSS library can trust the messages from the
TSPSS application. Once the TSPSS application invokes a TSPSS library operation,
the TSPSS library carries out the necessary protocol steps (including ones involving
other nodes) before returning a reply to the application via another local socket if a
reply is specified. Figure 4-1 illustrates the software architecture.
4.2 Threshold Signing Interface
The TSPSS library supports two signing related operations:
register-message Register a message with the TSPSS library. When the TSPSS
library running at a node ni receives sign requests from another node nr, the
TSPSS library at ni will only sign the message if that message has been regis-
tered by the TSPSS application at node ni.
sign-message Ask the TSPSS library to initiate the threshold signing protocol for a
message m. The TSPSS library will contact other nodes and return a signature
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struct signrequestheader{
int request-type;
int requestID;
int length;
}
struct signreply{
int requestID;
char signature [SIGNATURESIZE];
}
Figure 4-2: Signature Request/Reply Headers
to the TSPSS application once it has assembled the signature based on the
replies from the other server nodes running the TSPSS library.
A server running a Byzantine fault tolerant service registers the messages that
it is willing to sign using register-message. It can request a signature using
sign-message. If at least f other nodes have registered the same message, then
the TSPSS library at the sign-message invoking node writes the successfully gener-
ated signature to another local socket for the application to read. Pseudo code for
the reply format is given in Figure 4-2. The request-type can be register-message
or signnessage. The length is the length of the message to be registered or signed.
The sign-request -header is followed by the message to be registered or signed.
4.3 Secret Refreshing Interface
The TSPSS library supports two refresh related operations:
start-refresh The node at which this operation is invoked has version vi shares and
will start a version vj~j refresh run if one has not already been started.
get-witnesses The node at which this operation is invoked currently has version vi
shares and will return version vi witnesses.
To start a secret refreshing run, each server running the TSPSS application sends
the TSPSS library running on the same node a start-refresh message followed by
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struct refreshheader{
int epoch;
pss-location old-replicas[NUMBEROFREPLICAS];
pssjlocation new-replicas[NUMBEROFREPLICAS];
char witness [NUMBER_OFSHARES] [SIGNATURESIZE];
char signature [SIGNATURESIZE];
}
struct pss-location{
char verification-key[VERIFICATIONKEYSIZE];
sockaddrin addr;
}
Figure 4-3: Refresh Header
the refresh header via a local unix socket. Thus, only code running on the same
machine can ask the TSPSS library to start a refresh. Since the TSPSS application
decides which nodes will be the service nodes in epoch i,, the new nodes and their
verification keys are included in the header. The TSPSS library code at those nodes
will in turn send the refresh header to the new service nodes via TSPSS ports to
initiate the TSPSS refresh protocol at the new nodes. To keep the interface for
threshold signing and refreshing clean, we include everything the new nodes need to
know in the refresh header so that it can all be threshold signed and sent to the new
nodes. The refresh header needs to be threshold signed so that the new nodes can
trust that this is a valid refresh request.
The refresh header includes the epoch started by this run of the refresh protocol,
the network location and verification key for each old and new node, and the wit-
nesses for version vi secret shares. The TSPSS application can request the witnesses
from TSPSS library, then register the entire header and request that the header be
threshold signed as described in Section 4.2. Pseudo code for the refresh header is
given in Figure 4-3.
If a node receives a refresh header with an epoch smaller than its own epoch, the
node will not start the refresh protocol. Once a node completes the refresh protocol,
it sets its own epoch to the epoch in the refresh header.
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Chapter 5
Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate how well TSPSS scales in terms of f. Since we use
combinatorial secret sharing, which requires that we split our secret into I (= f)
shares, we know that the number of shares is exponential in f. For values of l in
relation to f, see Table 5.1. To determine how large f can be before TSPSS becomes
impractical, we consider the costs for signing and refreshing. For each, we consider the
cost in terms of the network bandwidth used and the speed with which the protocol
is completed successfully.
All experiments are run over a local area network(LAN). Experiments are run
on two types of machines. Type I machines each have an Intel(R) Pentium(R) 4,
3.06GHz CPU and 2,064MB of RAM. Type II machines each have an Intel Pentium
III, 596MHz CPU with 512MB of RAM. We only have four Type I machines and six
type II machines.
f 3f +1 1 = (3f -) 1'= (3)
1 4 4 3
2 7 21 15
3 10 120 84
4 13 715 495
Table 5.1: f, 3f + 1, 1, and 1'
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For the rest of this chapter, we will refer to the number of shares each node is
assigned according to the combinatorial secret sharing scheme as 1'. 1' = I - G-1)
because there are 1 shares and each node is in ( ) groups of f nodes.
5.1 Threshold Signing
5.1.1 Network Bandwidth Used
For an idea of the network bandwidth used by the signing protocol, we consider the
sizes of the messages and the number of messages sent. For authentication, we use
1024 bit RSA and Rabin signatures. Each sign request (whether it is a quick sign
request or a full sign request) consists of some header information, the message to be
signed, and the requester's Rabin signature. In the quick sign phase of the protocol, a
request is sent to f + 1 nodes. If the full signing protocol is initiated, a request is sent
to each of the 3f + 1 nodes in the system. Each reply has some header information,
the partial RSA signature(s) requested (each of the size of the RSA signature), and
the replier's Rabin signature. For a quick sign request, only one signature is requested
from each of f + 1 nodes. For a full signing request, 1' signatures are requested.
Thus, the requesting node sends:
(number of receivers) x (header size + message size + Rabin signature size)
= (f + 1) x (24 + message size + 128) bytes (for quick sign)
4 (3f + 1) x (24 + message size + 128) bytes (for full signing)
The replier sends:
header size + (number of RSA sigs x RSA sig size) + Rabin sig size
= 24 + (1)128 + 128 bytes (for quick sign)
+ 24 + (l')128 + 128 bytes (for full signing)
For a message of 160 bits (20 bytes), we give the amount of data sent by requesters
and repliers for quick sign and full sign in Table 5.2. We find that although the
bandwidth used by the signing protocol is small for f < 3, the bandwidth increases
quickly and becomes non-trivial f > 3
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f I Requester (quick) Requester (full) Replier (quick) Replier (full)
1 624 1,248 280 538
2 936 2,184 280 2,072
3 1,248 3,120 280 10,904
4 1,560 4,056 280 63,512
Table 5.2: Number of bytes sent by signature requesters and repliers during the quick
sign phase of the signing protocol and the full sign phase of the signing protocol,
based on calculations.
5.1.2 Speed of Protocol
Now we discuss how long it takes to run the protocol. We measure signing times for
i) when there are no faulty nodes and ii) when there are f faulty nodes and one of
the nodes chosen for a quick sign is faulty. For each f and for both (i) and (ii), we
run 3 trials of 100 signatures each. We use one Type II machine for each of the first
2f nodes, and one Type I machine for each of the next f + 1 nodes. Recall that
quick sign chooses the first f + 1 nodes to perform a quick sign and in our set up,
the first 2f machines are Type II machines. The speed of the full signing protocol
is determined by the (2f + 1)" fastest node. Thus, the quick sign is carried out by
the slower machines and the full sign time is also determined by the speed of the
slower machines, making the two times comparable. Since the proportion of fast to
slow machines is the same for each f, the signing times for different values of f are
comparable.
When there are no failed nodes, the quick sign phase of the hybrid signing scheme
finishes successfully. We run 10 trials each with 100 signatures. We give the statistics
for the times measured in Table 5.3. We find that the average time to finish one
signature if the quick sign phase succeed is less than 200 msec for f < 3. Since each
of the f + 1 chosen nodes adds its shares together (a negligible calculation in terms of
computation time) and performs one exponentiation, the quick sign times are similar
for the different values of f.
When there are f failures, with at least one of the faulty nodes being one of the
f + 1 nodes chosen for a quick sign, the quick sign does not complete successfully. We
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Ave Trial Time
16,053
17,562
17,645
Table 5.3: Signing
Ave Trial
53,893
72,903
131,750
Table 5.4:
Time L
Signing
Std Dev ( Ave Time per Signatu
12 161
349 176
85 176
Times (in msec) without Failures
Std Dev
1,992
1,259
1,697
Times (i
I
n
Ave Time per Signature
5,389
7,290
13,175
msec) with f Failures
run 10 trials each with 10 signatures. In our trials, the behavior of a faulty node is
that it does not reply to sign requests. Nodes that do not reply cause the maximum
delay in completing the signing protocol because the requester has to wait for a set
amount of time before starting the full signing protocol. For our trials, the requester
waits 5 seconds for quick sign replies, then initiates the full signing protocol if the
quick sign did not succeed during those 5 seconds. When full signing is triggered, the
amount of time it takes to finish a signing protocol increases significantly with the
value of f. We give the statistics for signing times with failures in Table 5.4.
We give a summary of what the signing times should be measuring, keeping in
mind that the network round-trip times (RTT's) for our experiments are very small
since all of our nodes are in a LAN.
For a quick sign, the amount of time it takes to complete the protocol consists of:
1 RTT to establish TCP connections
+ 1 RTT to send requests and receive replies
+ Time for the each node to add together responsible shares and generate 1 sig-
nature
+ Time for requester to put signatures together
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2
3
f
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re
f 1' Time Spent Generating Signatures
1 3 243.12
2 15 1,216
3 84 6,807
4 495 40,114
Table 5.5: Amount of time each replier spends computing partial signatures in a full
signing protocol, assuming each partial signature takes 385.75 ms to compute.
For the hybrid signing scheme, the worse case time consists of:
1 RTT to establish TCP connections
+ Amount of time spent waiting for quick sign replies (that, in the worse case,
never came)
+ 1 RTT to send requests and receive replies
+ Time for the fastest 2f + 1 correct nodes to each compute one partial signature
for each share they have (*)
+ Time for requester to put signatures together
To determine how much work the repliers in a full signing protocol are doing in
the step marked by (*) above, we run some experiments to see how long it takes to
produce one partial RSA signature with one subshare. Recall that our subshares are
random numbers. Thus, we generate 100 random numbers in the same size range as
our subshares. Then, we run 10 trial, each generating a partial RSA signature for
each of the 100 random numbers we generated. We find that the average trial time
is 8,104 msecs and the standard deviation is 2.51. Thus, the average time per partial
signature is 81.04 msec. We show what the computation time for each receiver node
is based on the number of shares each node has for the different values of f in Table
5.5. We find that most of the time for a full signing protocol is accounted for by
the 5 seconds spent waiting for quick sign replies and the time the receivers spend in
calculating partial signatures for the shares they hold.
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|f Old Node | New Node
1 19 12
2 309 20
3 11,730 2,880
Table 5.6: Kilobytes sent by TSPSS old nodes and new nodes during the refreshment
protocol
5.2 Secret Refreshing
5.2.1 Network Bandwidth Used
For an idea of how much network bandwidth the refresh protocol uses, we need to
account for both the data sent by TSPSS nodes and the data sent by the BFT service.
For the bandwidth used by TSPSS nodes, we give the total number of bytes TSPSS
nodes send via TCP in Table 5.6. These numbers do not include the TCP overhead
and they also do not include retransmitted bytes. For the bandwidth used by the
BFT service, we use the model that the amount of bandwidth used per operation is
(3f + 1) x (request size) + reply size. This model is reasonable when the request
or reply size is much larger than the BFT protocol overhead, which is true in our
system. For a more precise evaluation of BFT costs, see [1]. One artifact of the
BFT library we are using is that the BFT request and reply sizes are limited to 4KB.
Thus, to read or write more than 4KB to the BFT service requires multiple requests.
Breaking request and replies into smaller messages does not significantly increase the
number of bytes sent by the BFT so we ignore the 4KB limitation for the purposes
of determining the network bandwidth used.
The BFT service supports the following operations: write-proofs, node-ok,
read-proofs, read-chosen, and read-new-witnesses. write-proof s and node-ok
are write requests. The reply for each is just a confirmation that the operation has oc-
curred, thus the reply message for each is 8 bytes. The request size of write-proofs
is the number of proofs (i.e., 1 x 1') multiplied by the size of each proof (i.e., 128
bytes because that is the size of each RSA signature). The request size of node-ok
is 12 bytes. The other operations are read requests, each with request sizes of 12
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f Minimum | Maximum
1 24 47
2 1,468 3,413
3 87,851 219,513
Table 5.7: Minimum and maximum amount of bandwidth used(in KB) by the BFT
Agreement service, using the model that the number of bytes sent per operation is
(3f+1) x (request size)+ reply size. Note that these numbers represent the bandwidth
used by all BFT nodes, instead of per node
bytes. The reply size of read-proof s is the number of proofs multiplied by the size
of each proof. The reply size of read-chosen is (3f + 1) x 4 bytes. The reply size of
read.new-witnesses is I multiplied by the size of each witness (i.e., 128 bytes again
because that is the size of each RSA signature).
For each of the operations, there is a minimum number of times an operation must
be invoked before the protocol can succeed. If all nodes in the system were correct
then the maximum number of times that each operation can be invoked is correlated
to the number of nodes. A minimum of f + 1 old nodes must write their proofs for
the refresh protocol to complete. A maximum of 3f + 1 correct old nodes can write
their proofs. A minimum of 2f + 1 new nodes must read proofs and confirm that a
node's subshares are good for a minimum of f +1 old nodes. The maximum is 3f +1
new nodes for 2f + 1 old nodes. A minimum of 2f + 1 and a maximum of 3f + 1 new
nodes read which nodes' subshares have been chosen and the witnesses for the new
shares. We give the approximate bandwidth used in Table 5.7.
We see from Tables 5.6 and 5.7 that the amount of network bandwidth used for
f = 1 is very small. The amount of network bandwidth used for f = 2 is arguably
reasonable. The amount network bandwidth used for f = 3 is enormous.
5.2.2 Speed of Protocol
For the refresh protocol, we ran an instance of an old node and a new node on each
machine. We use one Type I machine for each of the first f + 1 old and new nodes
and one Type II machine for each of the next 2f old and new nodes. This setup
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makes the refresh times as f increases comparable because one condition for finishing
the refresh protocol is that at least f + 1 correct old nodes must have generated and
sent subshares and proofs.
We measured local refresh times for f = 1 and f = 2. We calculate lower bound
refresh times for f = 3 and f = 4. A local refresh time is measured from the time
a node initiates run vj+1 locally to the time run v±i+ terminates at that node. For
an old node, a run is initiated when it receives a refresh header from the TSPSS
application. The run at that old node terminates when the old node has received
computed message from 2f + 1 or more new nodes. A computed message is sent by
each new node once it has computed its new shares and witnesses. For a new node,
a run is initiated when it has first received and verified a refresh header from an old
node. The run terminates locally at that new node when it has received computed
messages from 2f other new nodes.
To avoid the situation where the last f new nodes must always request their shares
from other nodes because they did not have time to finish computing their shares,
our implementation lets new nodes finish verifying the chosen subshares that they
received and computing their shares of the secret before the node considers the run
to be terminated. The advantage of this approach is that the last f new nodes do
not have to request shares when they already have the subshares for computing those
new shares. The disadvantage is that a few slow nodes can lengthen the window of
vulnerability.
One way to prevent a correct but very slow node from unacceptably lengthening
the window of vulnerability is for all nodes to set a timer when they receive computed
messages from at least 2f + 1 new nodes. If they do not have all of their new shares
by the time the timer expires, then they will calculate the new witnesses and end
the run, thereby forgetting all the subshares they received. Then, they request their
shares from the 2f +1 new nodes who sent computed messages. At least f +1 of those
nodes will be correct nodes, and will send the correct shares, which can be verified
against the public witness.
We have not included timers in our implementation. In our experiments, the
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absence of a timer that forces slow nodes to end their run can be viewed as a timer
that does not expire before the new nodes finish computing their shares.
We took the refresh times for each node over five runs. Since the start and
termination conditions for new and old nodes differ, we plot them in different graphs.
See Figures 5-1 and 5-2. The graphs indicate the maximum, minimum, and median
times that nodes take to finish in each run. For the old nodes, some nodes have
smaller refresh times because the new nodes will start the refresh protocol as soon
as they receive one refresh header with a valid threshold signature. We start the
old nodes by ssh-ing into the work station to start the refresh protocol. Thus, some
old nodes start later than others and thus have a shorter refresh time. The average
refresh time for f = 1 is 14 seconds for old nodes and 16 seconds for new nodes. The
average refresh time for f = 2 is 280 seconds for old nodes and 288 seconds for new
nodes.
We give a summary of what the refresh times should be measuring, keeping in
mind that the network round trip and transfer times for our experiments are very
small since all of our nodes are in a LAN. Recall that for the implementation of the
BFT agreement service we are using, each BFT request and reply must be smaller
than 4KB. Thus, to read or write more than 4KB to the BFT service requires multiple
requests.
The amount of time it takes to finish a run of the refresh protocol consists of:
Time for work done by old nodes (working in parallel):
1 RTT to establish the TCP connections
+ 1 RTT to send the refresh headers
+ Time it takes a node to compute the proofs
+ 2 RTT x number of writes required for writing proofs to BFT
+ Time it takes a node to encrypt the messages for each of the other nodes
+ 1 RTT to send the encrypted subshares
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Figure 5-1: Refresh times for 5 runs with f = 1.
plot.
This is a max, min, and median
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Figure 5-2: Refresh times for 5 runs with f = 2
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Time for work done by a new node, for each of f + 1 old nodes:
1 RTT x number of reads to get proofs from BFT
+ Time to decrypt subshares
+ Time to check proofs
+ 1 RTT to notify the BFT that the sender's subshares are ok
Time for computing the new shares, once the subshares have been chosen:
1 RTT x number of reads to get which subshares are chosen and the witnesses
for the new shares1 from the BFT service.
+ Time it takes to compute the new shares and witnesses
+ 1 RTT to establish TCP connections, then send computed messages
A new node can start its work for an old node only after that old node has finished.
The new shares can be computed only after a set of subshares has been chosen for
each of the old nodes.
5.2.3 Extrapolated Lower Bounds
It takes too long and is too computationally expensive to run the refresh protocol
multiple times for f = 3. We ran the refreshment for f = 3 once on workstations
with some load and it took 3.37 hours to complete. Since we are trying to determine
the maximum f for which TSPSS is practical, and the f = 3 case takes so long, we
give a lower bound for refresh times based on the amount of time that computation
alone requires. Specifically, we determine the amount of time required to generate
proofs, decrypt the subshares, and check the proofs for the number of subshares the
protocol calls for. Since we use the Rabin scheme for asymmetric key encryption
and decryption, the encryption computations (i.e., squaring the subshares) take a
'The TSPSS code could have stored all the proofs and calculated the new witnesses from some of
these proofs. However, since a minority of the proofs generated will ultimately be used to calculate
the new witnesses, it makes sense to discard the proofs after checking the subshares and to retrieve
the new witnesses from the BFT, which stores all the proofs, once the subshares for the new shares
have been chosen.
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Calculation Type Ave Trial Time Std Dev Ave Time per Subshare
Decrypt 6,052 6.86 12.10
Proof Gen & Check 10,445 18.75 20.98
Table 5.8: Times for decrypting and proof generating and checking for Type I ma-
chines
Calculation Type Ave Trial Time Std Dev Ave Time per Subshare
Decrypting 6,052 6.86 12.10
Proof Chekcing 10,445 18.75 20.98
Table 5.9: Times for decrypting and proof generating and checking for Type II ma-
chines
negligible amount of time. Checking a proof involves generating the proof from the
received subshare and checking whether it equals the public proof for that subshare.
For Type I machines, we run 10 trials, each performing 500 decryptions and 500
proof generation and checking. For Type II machines, we run 10 trials, each perform-
ing 100 decryptions and 100 proof generations. We give the results in Tables 5.8 and
5.9.
The times for Type I and Type II machines are consistent with the machine
specifications. Type I machines have CPU's that are five times faster than the Type
II machine CPU's. For decryption and proof generation, Type I machines are a little
less than five times faster.
We break the computation time down into i) the time taken by old nodes to gen-
erate proofs and ii) the time taken by new nodes to decrypt and verify those proofs
for f + 1 old nodes. Recall that 2f + 1 new nodes need to verify f + 1 old nodes'
subshares and that we have f + 1 Type I machines each running one old node and
one new node. We expect that the f + 1 old nodes running on Type I machines will
generate proofs and send subshares first, and some new nodes running on Type II
machines are needed to check the subshares. Thus, the computation time for part (i)
is the Type I proof generation time per subshare multiplied by I subshares for each
of ' shares. The computation time for part (ii) is the Type II decrypt and proof
generation time per subshare multiplied by 1' subshares for each of ' shares from
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f I [' I Lower Bound with Type I&I
1 4 3 3
2 21 15 112
3 120 84 4,629 (1.3 hours)
4 715 495 199,172 (2.3 days)
Table 5.10: Extrapolated lower bound refresh times (in sec) based on the time it takes
for old nodes to generate proofs and for new nodes to decrypt and check proofs, using
f + 1 Type I machines and 2f Type II machines.
f Lower Bound with Type I
1 1
2 29
3 1,141 (0.5 hour)
4 47,817 (13.3 hours)
Table 5.11: Extrapolated lower bound refresh times (in sec) based on the time it takes
for old nodes to generate proofs and for new nodes to decrypt and check proofs, using
all Type I machines.
f + 1 old nodes. Part (i) and part (ii) times do not overlap and the estimated total
computation time is:
(1 x 1'x Type I proof generation time per subshare)
+ (I' x I' x (f + 1) x Type II decryption and proof generation time per subshare).
Table 5.10 gives lower bound refresh times, based only on encryption, proof gen-
eration, and proof checking with the encryption and proof generation numbers given
in Tables 5.8 and 5.9. These times are smaller than the refresh times we measured.
We find that using f + 1 Type I machines and 2f Type II machines, even the
refresh time based only on encryption and proof generation times is unacceptably
long for f > 2. For an idea of how much better the times would be with all Type I
machines, we calculate such a lower bound give them in Table 5.11.
To determine whether a better implementation can complete the protocol within
an acceptable amount of time, we analyze the optimistic scenario where we assume
all nodes are correct. The optimistic scenario is that all nodes are correct and thus
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f Optimistic Lower Bound with Type I
1 .5
2 12
3 363 (6 min)
4 12,499 (3.5 hours)
Table 5.12: Extrapolated lower bound refresh times (in sec) based on the optimistic
assumption that all nodes are correct and the time it takes for old nodes to generate
proofs and for new nodes to decrypt and check proofs, using all Type I machines.
redundancy in the system is not needed. If all nodes were correct, we would need f+1
old nodes to generate, encrypt, and send subshares, with only one node generating
subshares for each of share. Then 2f +1 new nodes would need to decrypt and check
the proofs for all of the shares.
Thus, in the optimistic scenario, the part (i) computation time is the Type I proof
generation time per subshare multiplied by 1 subshares for each of l/(3f + 1) shares.
The part (ii) computation time is the Type II decrypt and proof generation time
per subshare multiplied by 1' subshares for each of 1 shares. I.e., (1 x l/(3f + 1) x
Type I proof generation time per subshare) + (1' x 1x Type II decryption and proof
generation time per subshare). We calculate and give the results for the optimistic
scenario, using all Type I machines in Table 5.12.
Although the times do improve dramatically if we make optimistic assumptions,
the these times are still unacceptably long for f > 3. We conclude that the exponen-
tial (with respect to f) number of times that expensive operations like exponentiation
and decryption must be performed prohibits this scheme from being practical even
for small values of f like 3.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
This thesis describes TSPSS, a threshold signing and proactive secret sharing protocol
to address the authentication needs of reconfigurable Byzantine fault tolerant services
such as Rosebud [12] and Pond [11]. We based the proactive secret sharing part of
TSPSS on APSS [15], improving on the APSS work in two aspects: 1) Our refresh
protocol works across 2 sets of servers, with one set of nodes transferring their col-
lective knowledge of the secret to another set of servers that previously did not know
about the secret. 2) Where agreement is needed in the protocol, our refresh protocol
uses the Castro and Liskov BFT replication algorithm to achieve agreement.
Both TSPSS and APSS use combinatorial secret sharing which requires an ex-
ponential number of shares in f. The amount of computation time and bandwidth
required to carry out the sign and refresh protocols corresponds to the number shares
in the system.
The redundancy in the combinatorial secret sharing construction is useful. The
property that any f+1 nodes have all the shares is useful for recovering shares because
if 2f + 1 new nodes have received and verified their subshares, then we know that at
least f + 1 of those nodes are good and at least one correct node has each new share.
If there are correct nodes that do not have their new shares, they can recover their
shares from the 2f +1 nodes. Since at least f + 1 of those nodes are correct, the new
node will receive at least one good copy for each of the shares it should have and it
can check to see if a share is good using the corresponding witness.
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The property that 2f + 1 nodes hold each share is useful for signing because it
allows us to use the full signing protocol instead of having to repeat the quick sign
scheme with different groups of f-+1 nodes until one succeeds. The number of possible
groups of f + 1 nodes when choosing from 3f + 1 nodes is exponential in f. Thus,
many groups may need to be tried before a successful signature is generated.
However, the price of these useful properties is the exponentially increasing cost
of TSPSS. TSPSS performs well for f = 1. Its performance is arguable reasonable for
f = 2. It takes too much computation power and too much network bandwidth for
f > 3, which translates into requiring too much time before the protocol completes.
We find that the expensive operations TSPSS requires are the RSA partial signature
generation during threshold signing and decryption using the Rabin asymmetric key
cryptosystem and the exponentiations required for generating proofs for the subshares
during secret refreshing. Inherent to proactive secret sharing using combinatorial
secret sharing is that the number of shares is exponential in f. The number of RSA
partial signatures that must be generated is directly related to the number of shares
in the system. The number of encryptions and the number of proof generations is
proportional to the number of shares squared. Thus TSPSS requires and cxponcntially
increasing number of expensive operations to be performed and an exponentially
increasing amount of bandwidth as f increase.
Assuming that Moore's Law continues to hold, we can see that for f < 3, refresh
times for TSPSS will decrease to the point of being acceptable in the next ten years.
However, a better solution is needed because ten years is a long time and some systems
need f > 3.
This thesis has described a threshold signing and proactive secret sharing protocol
intended for use by Byzantine fault tolerant services. We implemented and evaluated
the cost of the protocol described. We identified the expensive operations in the pro-
tocol and quantified the practical costs of a secret sharing scheme with an exponential
number of shares in f.
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